This paper examines the effect of competition on second degree price discrimination in display advertising in Yellow Page directories. Our main empirical finding is that while competition is associated with lower prices, the association is not proportional along the range of product offerings. Instead, directories that face more competitors offer price schedules that display a greater degree of curvature than directories facing less competition. This means that purcahsers of the largest ads pay less per ad size relative to purchasers of small ads for ads in more competitive directories. * We are grateful for helpful discussions with
Introduction
As a general rule, competition drives down prices. But how much so can be complicated when firms offer a menu of prices. To the degree that competition affects firms' ability to price discriminate, competition is likely not only to lower the level of prices, but also to change prices within a menu relative to one another. This paper examines empirically the association between competition and price discrimination in the market for Yellow Pages advertising.
For several reasons, Yellow Pages advertising is well suited to examining the link between competition and price discrimination. First, in the great majority of markets, advertising prices vary nonlinearly with the size of the advertisement purchased, which suggests the possibility of second degree price discrimination. 1 Second, Yellow Pages advertising markets vary in competitiveness. While all markets are served by a telephone company publisher, many markets are also served by a varying number of independent publishers. Finally, publishers offer a standard range of advertisements, making products comparable across markets. Our data set consists of a cross-section of almost all Yellow Pages directories in the United States in 1997.
We find, as might be expected, that directories that face more competition offer lower price levels than do less competitive directories. However, the differences are not uniform across buyers. Instead, we find that facing more competition is associated with offering proportionally lower prices per size for the purchase of large advertisements than for small advertisements.
While we focus on documenting these empirical effects, there are several different explanations for what we observe and we describe them briefly here. 2 Recent theoretical work such as Rochet and Stole (1999) and Stole (1995) addresses non-linear pricing under competition and finds that under some circumstances prices decline proportionally more at the top of the product range. Also, the presence of a positive feedback loop between consumer usage and advertising documented in Rysman (2003) suggests that publishers may discount large advertisements more in order to attract users. It is also possible that new entrants focus on selling to large advertisers first, which would also imply our result.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on second degree price discrimination by empirically describing the association between competition and the structure of relative prices within a price schedule. 3 Closely related to our paper, Miravete and Röller (2003) take a 1 One cannot conclude that nonlinear prices are discriminatory without considering costs (Lott and Roberts, 1991) . In the next section, we describe in detail how we identify prices as discriminatory.
2 A previous version of this paper, Busse and Rysman (2002) goes into greater detail in discussing explanations. 3 Several previous papers have studied second-degree price discrimination. Shepard (1991) identifies price discrimination at gas stations that have both self-serve and full-serve capacity. Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) analyze price schedules for electric utilities in France. Leslie (1998) considers the welfare implications of nonlinear pricing at a Broadway theater. McManus (2000) , Cohen (2000a) and Crawford and Shum (2003) all consider monopoly or oligopoly markets (coffee shops, paper towel manufacturers, book publishers structural approach to study quantity discounting schemes in celluar telephone plans. The most similar investigation to ours is in Borenstein (1989) , which finds some evidence that competition affects low fares more than proportionally in airline pricing, although that is not the main focus of his paper. 4 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Yellow Pages advertising industry. Section 3 describes the data we use. Section 4 describes the identification strategy we use to test the association between competition and price discrimination. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes.
Industry Characteristics
The Yellow Pages industry is characterized by competition between small groups of asymmetric publishers. Most publishers publish directories yearly and distribute them for free, one to every phone line. Utility publishers are associated with a telephone company, either a Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC) or an independent local telephone company. Directories published by utility publishers rarely compete. Most competition is provided by non-utility publishers that differentiate their books from those published by utilities by choosing different distribution areas and by including different information or organizing their book in a different way. 5 As Figure 1 shows, the median person is served by two directories from two separate publishers; more than 15% of people are served by three or more publishers. Utility directories typically dominate their markets, both charging higher prices and selling more pages of advertising. The average price for a double quarter column advertisement at a utility directory is $1,177 while the average price at a non-utility directory is $926. Rysman (2003) reports (in a smaller data set) that telephone company directories are larger in terms of page size and garner substantially more usage. Rysman (2003) ascribes this asymmetry to consumer preference for utility-published directories and the presence of a positive feedback loop between advertising and usage. For the purposes of this paper we take the asymmetry among directories as given and analyze the associated prices.
Yellow Pages advertising is particularly important to small local businesses. The categories and cable television providers, respectively) and show that firms use product quality as a screening device. Nevo and Wolfram (2002) consider couponing by ready-to-eat cereal producers.
4 See Busse and Rysman (2002) for a possible explanation for the difference between Borenstein's result and ours. Borenstein (1991) and Cohen (2000b) also take a reduced form approach to analyze second degree price discrimination, although they do not check for differential effects of competition on the price schedule.
5 Non-utility publishers obtain data on potential advertisers (location and telephone number) at reasonable prices as a result of a 1992 Supreme Court decision that White Pages are not copyrightable. This outcome seems to have been widely expected, as independent Yellow Pages publishers have existed for decades. to which users refer most frequently are generally served by local businesses, such as auto repair, doctors, lawyers, and beauty salons. 6 These businesses value Yellow Page advertising because customers are exposed to it at exactly the time they are poised to buy. Size, color, placement, and graphic design all contribute to the effectiveness of a Yellow Pages ad, although industry participants disagree over which elements generate the greatest return on investment for advertisers.
Data
Our data are compiled from several sources. The centerpieces of the data are prices and distribution areas for directories. Prices come from the Rate and Data publication of the Yellow Pages Publishers Association (YPPA), an industry trade group that represents 95% of the sales in the industry. These data are cross-sectional and contain the price for every type of advertisement sold at every directory published in 1997 whose publisher is a member of the YPPA. Multiple sources in the YPPA and, anecdotally, among advertisers assure us that the list prices are indeed the transaction prices. There are occasional discounts for placing ads in multiple jointly owned books, or promotional inducements to upgrade the size of the previous year's ads, which we ignore. Directories sell on average 71 different types of advertisements, ranging from a listing in bold letters to a full color back cover. We focus on display advertisements without special colors. This category is the most common offering across directories and is closely watched in the industry. Advertisements in this category vary in size (quarter column, double quarter column, half page, full page, etc.), with 75% of directories offering between 6 and 10 sizes in this category. Using data on the number of columns in a directory, we convert ad sizes to a per page equivalent. For example, a double quarter column in a four-column directory is equal to an eighth of a page. Prices depend on the size of the ad and the directory in which they are purchased, and range from $75.60 for a quarter column ad in Ridgeway, South Carolina (population 5,000) to just over $70,000 for a full page in Manhattan.
We augment these data with detailed information about directory distribution areas. Claritas Inc. collects directory distribution areas as maps that we match with 5-digit zip code centroids. Centroids are map points that represent population centers of zip codes. We assume that if a publisher distributes to a centroid, it delivers to an entire zip code. Claritas also supplied us with population data at the 5-digit zip code level for 1997.
The distribution data allow us to construct measures of the number of competing publishers each directory faces, weighted by population. For a particular directory i, we calculate the number of competing publishers as
where N i is the number of people who receive directory i, n ij is the number of people who receive both directories i and j based on zip codes to which both directories i and j are distributed, and J i is the set of directories that are published by a different publisher from directory i. Figure 2 gives graphical hypothetical examples of the calculation. Each example gives the competition measure for directory i if the directories' distribution areas were represented by the labeled boxes and population were uniformly distributed. This measure could equivalently be thought of as the expected number of additional publishers from which a recipient of directory i also receives directories. 
Directory k Directory j
The variation in competition across markets is determined by publishers' past entry decisions. Important but unobserved factors are such things as whether the area is suitable for a more localized directory or a broader scope directory than what is offered by the utility publisher, whether the independent publisher already has directories in neighboring areas, unobserved local prevalence of Yellow Page usage, or labor or regulatory issues that could affect entry. Entry is also in part determined by variables that affect pricing.
We use county-level demographic data to account for geographic price variation. We use the 1995 County USA CD-ROM, compiled from census data. We construct directory-level demographic data as a population-weighted average of county-level data. Industry sources suggest that people who have recently moved use Yellow Pages relatively more, as do educated, high-income people who own their own home. In contrast, people who live in cities or take public transportation use Yellow Pages less. To the extent that advertising prices are driven by the amount of usage, we expect these variables to predict prices. Our data set covers 5009 directories across the entire United States. We excluded 997 directories for which important data were missing.
Identification
Price discrimination is commonly understood to occur when the same product is sold to different customers at different prices. One of the necessary conditions for price discrimination, however, is that arbitrage across units sold at different prices must be impossible. This means that the products sold at discriminatory prices cannot be, in the strictest possible interpretation, the "same product." 7 In every case, a judgment call must be made as to whether what is sold to different customers at different prices are similar enough to classify the circumstance as price discrimination.
We believe that Yellow Pages display advertising is indeed an example of price discrimination. This is because, first, from the publisher's perspective the two goods are almost completely fungible. Any given page could be divided into a single full page ad, two half page ads, four quarter page ads, or a number of other combinations, subject only to the constraint that the display ads and accompanying listings for each heading be grouped on adjacent pages. Second, from the advertiser's perspective, ads of different sizes are extremely close substitutes. They accomplish the same function in exactly the same way, except that a larger ad has greater value because it may better capture a reader's attention, convey a stronger signal of the advertiser's quality, have space to convey more information, etc.
In practical terms for this paper, we identify price discrimination to exist when the pricecost ratio changes over the price schedule. 8 However, we do not observe the marginal cost of an advertisement. As a result, we take a difference-in-differences approach, differencing across advertisement sizes and markets with different number of competitors. (Note that our data is cross-sectional so that the second difference is across different locations, not across time periods.)
We test two basic hypotheses, of which the second is the main emphasis of the paper. Our first test is whether the price-cost ratio is smaller for directories that face a larger number of competitors. Let P m (s) be the price of an advertisement of size s and c m (s) be the marginal cost of selling an advertisement of that size for a monopolist (or, more generally, a directory facing less competition). Let P d (s) and c d (s) be similarly defined for duopolist (more generally, a directory facing more competition). We want to know if:
For this test, we assume that the cost of producing an ad of a given size does not change with competition: c m (s) = c d (s). Imposing this assumption and taking the log of the above generates our first test:
Our second hypothesis, and the focus of the paper, is that the slope of the price-cost ratio differs among firms facing different numbers of competitors; in other words, we hypothesize that the extent of price discrimination between high and low valuation customers will vary with the competition the directory faces. We want to know if, for h > l where h is the size of a bigger ad and l the size of a smaller ad:
A sufficient condition to proceed is that c m (s) = c d (s). However, we can make the less restrictive assumption that the ratio of the costs of a large ad to a small ad does not change with the number of competitors. That is, if competition changes the cost of all advertisements by a multiplicative constant, our test is still valid. 9 Consequently we test:
Implicit in this approach is a second assumption: that relative demand for different sizes of advertisements is approximately constant across markets.
In practice, we specify a tractable functional form to describe the shape of the price schedule.
We use the function P ij = A i s β i j to characterize the price schedule for each directory, where P ij is the price of an advertisement of size j at directory i and s j is the size as a fraction of a page. This function allows a variety of shapes including linear pricing in size (β i = 1), size discounting (β i < 1), and a size premium (β i > 1). In practice, we estimate the log version of this function,
where ij is mean independent of ln(s ij ). In this formulation, α i captures the price level and β i captures the degree of curvature at each directory.
Our main objective is to find out how β i varies with competition. If the relative prices of different size ads does not vary with competition-that is, if the lower price level that we anticipate will be associated with greater competition applies proportionally to all ad sizesthen β i will not vary with competition. If competition is associated with prices for large ads that are lower by a greater proportion than prices for small ads, then β i will decrease in competition. 10 Under this functional form, our test specified in Equation 3 is equivalent to testing β i ≶ β j where directories i and j differ based on the level of competition they face. 11
As stated above, the identifying assumptions of this approach are that relative demand and relative cost for advertisements of different sizes are the same across markets, or at least not related to the number of competitors. Note that cost or demand levels (and their impact on market structure) are captured by the fixed effects α i , and should not affect the estimate of β i .
We estimate this relationship between competition and the shape of the price schedule by regressing β i on measures of the directory's competitive environment. Specifically, we wish to estimate:
using the number of competing publishers to measure competition. The parameter γ 1 is the 10 It is interesting to compare our measure of the price schedule to other potential measures. We rejected the price range, coefficient of variation of per unit price, or the standard deviation of per unit prices because it is possible for them to increase but for βi to decrease. In other words, they do not clearly distinguish between level changes and curvature changes. Interestingly, the coefficient of variation on price (not per-unit price) is monotonic in βi (for reasonable values of βi). We focus on βi because of its clear interpretation as curvature.
11 Theorem 1 in Busse and Rysman (2002) shows formally that testing for differences in the curvature of price schedules as measured by βi is equivalent to testing whether high or low prices differ by a greater proportion.
parameter of primary interest. In practice, we estimate γ 1 by substituting Equation 5 into Equation 4 to get:
The presence of the interaction of ν i and ln(s j ) in the "error term" of Equation 6 implies a particular form of heteroskedasticity which we account for using Feasible GLS. 12 In this case, α i is captured by directory-level dummy variables.
Estimation and Results
Our results come in two parts. First, we analyze the association between the number of competitors a directory faces and its price level. Because we have strong priors on the direction of the association between competition and price level, this analysis is helpful for verifying the usefulness our measure of competition. The second part of our results studies the relationship between our measure of competition and price curvature; this second part is the focus of the paper.
Price levels
We calculate a directory's price level as the median of the per page rates for the set of sizes the directory offers. We regress the log of this median rate on the number of competing publishers as defined in Section 3. We also use demographic variables to control for variation in price levels across markets that is unrelated to competitive interactions. 13 The results of this regression are reported in Table 1 . The main result from the table is that directories that face a larger number of competitors offer a lower median price. The magnitude of the results in the first column can be interpreted as follows: facing the equivalent of one additional publisher covering a directory's entire market would be associated, all else equal, with the log of the directory's median price being lower by 0.076, which implies that the median price itself would be lower by 7.2%. In column 2, the number of competing publishers is incorporated into the regression with a set of categorical variables. The results are similar; the estimates imply that each one-publisher increment in competition is associated with prices that are lower by 7.2% to 9.4%.
12 Amemiya(1978) discusses estimation when coefficients are assumed to be the dependent variables of another regression equation and provides a computationally fast method of estimation, which we use here. 13 Our results are very similar if we use the rate of a particular size ad-for example, a full page or a double quarter column-in place of the median per page rate.
Some caution must be exercised in interpreting these results. First, the data are crosssectional, so the empirical relationships described above are inferred from cross-directory comparisons rather than time series variation. Second, if prices are high in a particular area for reasons that are unobservable to the researcher, there may be greater entry in this area. This endogeneity would bias the coefficient on the number of competitors in the positive direction.
This would cause our OLS regression to underestimate the typically expected effect of exogenous variation in competition on prices. Another reason that these estimates could be understated is classical measurement error. Given the heterogeneous nature of Yellow Pages publishers, the number of competing publishers is an imperfect proxy for the level of competition. Seeing the negative effect of competition on price assures us that our measure is capturing some important aspect of market structure.
In addition to the competitive effect, the control variables generally have the expected sign. Prices at directories published by utilities are about twice those at non-utility publishers.
Prices are higher in larger and wealthier markets, and lower in urban markets and markets in which more people use public transportation. Markets in which there are more business establishments have lower prices, although the number of business establishments may indicate urbanity. Somewhat surprisingly, the fraction of residents who have recently moved does not have a statistically significant effect on price. 14 Column 3 controls for publisher-level fixed effects. Using just within-publisher variation, we see a smaller, but still significant, negative association between competition and price levels.
Price Curvature
The focus of our paper is on understanding the relationship between competition and price discrimination. We begin with a simple comparison of the prices of two common ad sizes and how that comparison varies with competition. We then present our main results.
Two of the most common size offerings in our data set are the double quarter column and the full page, one of the smallest sizes and the largest size commonly offered. We regress the log of these two prices on demographic data as in Table 1 , along with dummy variables for the two sizes and interactions of the dummy variables with the number of competing publishers.
The results appear in Table 2 . While competition is associated with lower prices for both ad sizes, the estimated effect is proportionally much larger, and statistically different, for the full page ad compared to the double quarter column. At the mean of the data, the coefficient on the full page-competition interaction term is consistent with the addition of one more competitor being associated with a full page ad price that is lower by $586, which is 12.5% of the average full page price. The double quarter column-competition interaction term implies that additional competition is associated with a double quarter column price that is lower by $13, or 1.4% of the average double quarter column price.
This result suggests that there is a stronger association between competition and the price of large advertisements than between competition and the price of small advertisements. However, there are some problems with this regression. As described above, there may be endogeneity between unobserved demographic characteristics and the number of competitors. Furthermore, by only looking at two prices, we have ignored a number of directories and dropped a great deal of price information. However, our main estimation specification, Equation 6 of the previous section, handles these problems. Estimating Equation 6 is analogous to repeating the estimation in Table 2 with directory dummy variables instead of demographic variables and with size entered in a log linear way instead of via dummy variables. This approach allows us to compare curvature across directories that differ in their size offerings, ignoring all level differences in prices. We turn to these results now. We consider the endogeneity issue in more detail after presenting the results.
Our main goal is to estimate the determinants ofβ i . Table 3 reports the distribution of β i 's obtained by estimating Equation 4 for each directory via OLS. 15 The meanβ i is 0.91 and about 79% of the sample practices some form of quantity discounting. Nonetheless, many directories are close to 1 and a small portion charges a quantity premium. Note that our measure of the price schedule fits best when per-unit prices are monotonic, either increasing or decreasing. Although per-unit price schedules are generally downward sloping, only 15% are monotonically decreasing. Even so, the R-squared statistics from estimating Equation 4 are remarkably high: the mean across directories is 0.9899 with a standard error of 0.0338, suggesting that our functional form assumption is not at great odds with the data.
Column 1 of Table 4 reports estimates of γ 0 and γ 1 . The coefficient on the competition-size interaction, γ 1 , is precisely estimated at -0.027. That is, β i is lower in markets with more competitors, implying that the price schedule is more curved in those markets. The results can be interpreted in the following way: In a four-column directory, a full-page advertisement is 16 times as large as a quarter column advertisement. The estimate of the constant term at 0.939 implies that a directory facing no competition sets its price for a full-page ad to be 13.51 times that of a quarter column ad. A duopoly directory charges 12.54 times as much for the full page, 15 For these purposes, we drop the 29 directories with fewer than 3 sizes offered in the display category. and a triopolist charges 11.63 times as much. That is, each additional competitor is associated with a decease of 7.7% in the ratio of the largest to smallest price. One can also interpret these results as follows: Monopolists decrease the per page price by 6.1% when an advertiser doubles the size of an ad; each additional publisher covering the entire market is associated with an further decrease in the size of that discount of 2.7 percentage points, or about 44%. 16 We have interpreted the estimated relationship between β i and our competition measure as indicating that directories that face more competitors offer lower prices for large ads. While it would be possible to get this numerical result if directories that face more competitors offer higher prices for small ads, Table 1 shows that the overall price level decreases in competition.
Together these results suggest that prices for large ads are proportionally lower than prices of small ads for more competitive directories; this interpretation is borne out in Table 2 . Table 1 and Table 4 together tell us that each additional competing publisher is associated with a decrease in the price of a double-quarter column advertisement of 7.7%. The decrease for a quarter-column advertisement is only 5.9% and the decrease for a full-page ad is 12.8%.
In column 2, the competition measure is incorporated into the regression using indicator variables for discrete intervals. In this specification, price schedules again show increased sizediscounting associated with increased competition. The coefficients of the three competition variables in column 2 are statistically significantly different, and their magnitude is fairly similar to what is estimated in column 1, where the relationship between competition and β i is assumed to be linear.
In light of our results, we now turn to the question of whether our identifying assumptions are justified; namely, that there are no unobserved, price-relevant factors that are both related to competition and whose effect varies with size. In econometric terms, these assumptions mean that components of ij are not correlated with the competition i · ln(s j ) term. In practical terms, this might occur if the relative demand or relative costs for large vs. small ads varied systematically with the degree of competition a directory faced.
We begin by addressing the relationship of relative costs to competition. What we know about the cost function suggests that the relative costs of different sizes of ads either does not vary with competition, or varies in a way that is biased against our results. The costs of production for Yellow Pages can be broken down into four components: production (paste-up, layout, design, etc.), manufacturing (printing), distribution (delivery to residences and businesses), and sales and customer acquisition and retention. The first element of these marginal cost components, designing and laying out an individual ad into the directory, seems unlikely to be affected by the number of competing publishers. If directories get smaller when there is more competition, then the marginal costs attributable to the second component, printing and distribution, might change with competition. For example, in the case of printing, it may be that the marginal cost to print each page of a directory falls with the number of pages in the directory. However, that would not change the ratio of the costs of printing a full page ad vs. an eighth-page ad. In the case of distribution, the costs are probably primarily determined by the number and geographic density of the delivery locations rather than the size of the directory.
Even if delivery costs are related to the size of the directory, the ratio of the marginal costs of delivering a large vs. a small ad seem unlikely to change with competition.
By far the largest cost of publishing a directory is the remaining component, sales. If having multiple publishers trying to attract ads from the same set of advertisers makes sales forces have to work harder to sell each ad, and if salespeople compete more aggressively to sell large ads than small ads, then increased competition could lead to an increase in the marginal cost of selling a large advertisement relative to a small advertisement. In such a scenario, however, the cost of a large advertisement would be larger relative to a small one in more competitive markets. Since we find that prices move in the opposite direction, the proposed correlation is not driving our results.
We now turn to the relationship between demand and competition. A possible link between the two would be via entry if entry, and hence competition, is endogeneous to prices. The directory fixed effects should absorb the standard endogeneity between entry and whether prices overall are high or low. There may still be endogeneity between the number of competitors and the curvature of prices if the relative demand for different sizes of advertisements differs across localities. However, there is no theoretical guidance as to how this should work. A straightforward story would have more directories attracted to areas with greater demand for larger (high-margin) advertisements. This effect would bias our results against what we have found. While it would be possible to construct a scenario where endogeneity could generate our results-for instance, markets with low entry costs attracting independent directories and small retailers who demand small advertisements-we do not find such scenarios very plausible.
Furthermore, given the information that we observe and the variation in our data, we do not think that an empirical investigation would be likely to be illuminating. Therefore, our results must be interpreted with the caveat that such an interaction is not controlled for.
Another concern in interpreting our results is whether we mismeasure competition in a way that is related to curvature. In particular, it could be the case that other advertising media, like Internet, radio or newspaper, are more relevant competitors to Yellow Pages for small ads than large ads and are more relevant in areas with more Yellow Pages competition. Because we focus on display advertisements (as opposed to listings of name and number) and use 1996 data (before the Internet developed as a substitute for the Yellow Pages), we hope that this effect is weak, although we cannot definitively reject it.
One final concern with our estimates is whether the hypothesis test we perform is robust to misspecification of the functional form of the price schedule. Using the functional form
j assumes that each price schedule passes through the origin. Suppose that directories respond to competition by shifting price schedules up or down by an additive constant. Then competition would affect β i even though competition only caused "level" changes. Note that under our definition of price discrimination, such level changes do represent a change in the structure of price discrimination because high prices are shifted by proportionally less. Even so, in order to be sure that such changes are not driving our results, we renormalized each price sequence so it passed through the origin. We did this by subtracting off the lowest price and size from the remaining prices and sizes at each directory separately. We then recomputed β i for each directory and re-ran our tests. The results were very similar to those reported.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between competition and price-size schedules offered for display advertisements in Yellow Pages directories. Our primary finding is that price schedules generally embody size discounts, and that increased competition between directories is associated with an increased rate of discounting. Our estimates imply that an increase in our competition measure equivalent to one additional competitor is associated with a more than 12% lower full page advertisement price, but with only a 6% lower price for a quarter column advertisement. 
